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Liberal academics and enthusiastic lay audiences hailed the public debuts of the
Calvinist theologian and acclaimed orator László Ravasz as the leading representa-
tive of a new generation of modernist clergymen in the early 1910s. Much to the re-
gret of his liberal critics, in the wake of the collapse of historic Hungary following
World War I his message stemmed from a modern cult and culture of defeat and was
in no way a continuation of the old school liberals of the belle époque of the Dual
Monarchy. In his memoires, which were written during the 1960s, Ravasz described
his erstwhile political views as “fetishes,” but defended his theological motives.
This raises questions concerning a central problem of modern religious experience:
how can one map the constantly evolving frontiers between rampant secularization
and the no less permanent and certainly insatiable nostalgia for the sacred order of
things in modern societies? By redefining what is religious, the currents of
Protestant and Catholic thought in interwar Hungary presented in the following arti-
cle established intellectual contexts on both sides that make not only the historical
description of Christian identity but also the very notion of modernity a function of
multi-layered readings. At the same time, the Catholic and Protestant rapproche-
ment may be interpreted as a symptom of the decline of religious explanations of the
world and history, because they testify to the fact that the dialectics of historical in-
terpretation are no longer defined by the particular approaches of Catholic or
Protestant theology or the differences between the two, but rather by the state of
competition between universalist utopias and religious world explanations forced
into the conservative camp, which necessarily bleaches the emphatic elements of
Christian teachings as well.
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Ever since anticipation of the last days predicted by Christianity ceased to de-
termine European history and political action, religious indifference has been the
unifying force on which the integration of the political community has been built.
Nonetheless, as the development of modern historiography clearly demonstrates,
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the separation of religion and politics is a much more complex issue than one
might customarily assume it to be. As Arnaldo Momigliano once said,
Paradoxically, Christian ideas penetrated into modern historical
books only in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when faith in
Christianity was at its lowest. […] When that happened, modern his-
torical methods had already been shaped upon their ancient models.
Modern philosophy of history – on a Christian basis – and modern
historical methods – on a classical basis – have never quite agreed
with each other (Momigliano, 1990, 156).
This insoluble dilemma was responsible in the Enlightenment tradition of the sec-
ularization thesis that the history of religious questions in a large part has been
transformed into an operation of uncovering ideological instrumentalization.
Similarly, the semantically pregnant language offered by the Christian tradition
has also been metamorphosed into a historical storehouse of symbols to be sup-
pressed or, failing suppression, constantly reinterpreted, that is, secularized. Nev-
ertheless, the existential vertigo felt over choices between alternative actions and
articulated in the language of religion has a strong political relevance which is
structurally present in modern history as well.
It is generally understood that as a metahistorical concept modernity can be in-
terpreted as discontinuity, the unfolding of the Promethean myths of the revolu-
tion, a rich and ever renewing production of the philosophies of progress and
emancipation. But from the onset it also displays an equally important other side
in the forms of nostalgia and reaction (Starobinski, 1966, 81–103; Boym, 2001,
3–32). Modernity in more than one aspect is the culture of defeat. The bold earthly
desires of the prophets of modernity arose less and less from the experiential hori-
zon of the past, while the increasingly radical paradigms of progress, treading on
one another, are at the very moment of their realization crushed by the barren ex-
perience of unfulfilled expectations and the malaise bred from insatiable desires.
Since the mainstream rationalist tale of the secularist thesis suffers from serious
deficiencies, an alternative is needed. When speaking of the modern situation of
the religious experience, one alternative lies in the historical exploration of a culti-
vated sense of victimhood, deception and defeat as a basis for overcoming the on-
tological consequences of the failure of the Promethean enterprise.
In this sense, the issue of the religious revival of the Christian churches in the
interwar period has yet to enter the professional literature of mainstream Hungar-
ian intellectual and political history. The role of the denominational factor has
long been a problem of Hungarian historiography, though mostly treated as and
restricted mainly to the institutional and power conflicts of the different churches.
Through an examination of interwar Protestantism’s leading figure and dominant
theologian Calvinist Bishop László Ravasz, as well as of the stances of prominent
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representatives of political Catholicism (such as Ottokár Prohászka and Béla
Bangha) on the denominational issue and Christian union, I will attempt to seek an
explanation as to how the existential motivations, above all a deep-seated spiritual
condition of insecurity originating in the respective theological and historical sit-
uations of their Churches, formed Protestant and Catholic religious-denomina-
tional identities in 20th century Hungary.
The Intellectual Legacy of Liberal Protestantism
Following the Kantian and Schleiermacherian currents of West European
Protestant theology, 19th century Hungarian Protestantism was receptive to the
“horizontal universalism” (to use Benedict Anderson’s phrase) present in the na-
tional idea (Anderson, 1991, 7). It was more closed, however, to any radically
questioning of the historically evolved hierarchy of the social order. It was liberal
and national, rather than liberal and democratic, and it felt a greater kinship with
conservative liberalism of the Macaulay type than with freethinking radicalism.
In one respect liberal Protestantism kept in sight the moral ideal found in the
neo-Kantian philosophy of cultural conservatism, which at the turn of the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries assumed a peculiar balancing role that moderated
the increasingly radicalized intellectual movements. At the same time, it wished
to continue to implement consistently the Hegelian principle of progress. Of
course, in the long run this was untenable, especially since behind the fecund dis-
course and artificial activism of liberal Protestantism lurked two suppressed basic
problems – or non-dits, to use French historian Michel de Certeau’s expression:
the embarrassing radicalism of the question of God and the Protestant resentment
of Roman Catholicism’s much-envied organizational success (Michel de Certeau,
1975, 71). The latter remained an insoluble problem and lent to the liberal dis-
course an unmistakably melancholic tone even in the heydays of the liberal cen-
tury. Nevertheless, by around 1900 the most important menace became the fact
that the chief characteristic of Protestant liberalism, the individualistic basic prin-
ciple of freedom of conscience, was also espoused by the radical ideologies and
militant social democracy. In this respect, Protestantism’s ostensibly liberal alli-
ance with patriotic ideals, seen as an aim both conservative and apologetic, was
especially burdensome. The debate in Nyugat [West], the leading progressive lit-
erary and social review of the 1910s, forcefully illustrated the lost magic of the
erstwhile “progressive religion.” Members of the new generation of intellectuals
represented by Nyugat, such as writers and essayists Dezsõ Szabó (1879–1945),
Endre Ady (1877–1919) and Zsigmond Móricz (1879–1942), all of whom had a
Protestant background, saw the religious and patriotic potential of contemporary
Protestantism exhausted: “The problem of Hungarian Protestantism […] is that
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the time is fast approaching when this living organization becomes an exhibit in a
museum” (Móricz Zsigmond, 1913, 217). Thus these challenges put this fine
tuned regime on the defensive vis-à-vis the new, class-based definition of prog-
ress and modernity as articulated by socialism. Thus, by the eve of the First World
War the intellectual state of liberal Protestantism had been permanently shaken in
Hungary.
Religion as Life and Instinct in the Early Writings of László Ravasz
A new generation of Hungarian Reformed theologians, first and foremost
László Ravasz (1882–1975), came to the forefront of church life after the lost war
and the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Liberal academics and en-
thusiastic lay audiences both hailed his public debuts not only as a theologian but
also as an acclaimed orator. At the start of his career in the first decades of the 20th
century Ravasz was considered the leading representative of a new generation of
modernist clergymen in the first decades of the 20th century. Also a prolific au-
thor and a tireless organizer, Ravasz had an innate talent to transmit his message
and gain the acceptance both of his peers and large and varied congregations of
Protestant circles. He had a synthetic and approachable personality and never hes-
itated to use the different means of modern media of his time to make his voice
heard by many, far more than his predecessors could ever have imagined. His
name is rightly associated with the cultural and intellectual appeal of the revival of
Protestant religiosity in interwar Hungary while he was elevated to high church
offices and decorated by numerous and distinguished official honors. In 1907, at
age 25 he became full professor of his alma mater, the Kolozsvár Academy of Re-
formed Theology, where he taught until 1921. In that year he was invited to serve
as pastor of the leading Calvinist congregation of Budapest and was also elected
bishop of the Danubian District of the Hungarian Reformed Church. Between
1921 and 1948 (until his forced resignation by the Communist regime), he was
one of Hungary’s most influential and powerful clergymen. He became also a
member of the Upper House of Parliament in 1927 and later of the Royal Guber-
natorial Council of Governor Miklós Horthy (1869–1957).
But László Ravasz was not only an outstanding organizer and a perspicacious
church politician, he was an innovative theologian as well. Trained in the school
of neo-Kantian historicism, the young Ravasz, also a Freemason, was thought by
many observers to be a liberal theologian of the left in the first decade of the
1910s. In his early years he argued for a supra-dogmatic religiosity which over-
comes the rigidity and the historical aleas of the religious and denominational or-
thodoxies. In his inaugural lecture as the holder of the Practical Theology Chair of
the Kolozsvár Academy of Reformed Theology in 1907 he declared
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all the dogmas, habits and traditional views that have had a great im-
pact on every kind of advancement lost their magic in our eyes. We
know that these are only the temporal necessities of the Christian pi-
ety, historically accumulated like the time-worn formations of
coral-reefs [in the sea] and becoming life-threatening barren cays
(Ravasz, 1907, 52).
In an honorary tribute to his ecclesiastical mentor, the liberal theologian and
superintendent of the Transylvanian District of the Hungarian Reformed Church,
György Bartók (1845–1907), he asserted that, “the theology that disrespects criti-
cism will sink into scholasticism,” and expressed a rationalist credo by repeating
the apology of 19th century liberal German theology that “we can make the world
believer only by the cost of critique” (Ravasz, 1908, 645–52).
But Ravasz was always more than a mere follower of neo-Kantian rationalism.
Although he wanted to be “modern and constructive,” his critic also targeted the
deistic deviations of the contemporary Calvinist preachings, which bypassed the
core-teachings of Christianity and Jesus himself and failed to offer an authentic
religious Erlebnis beyond the customary “empty phrases” on conventional topics
and nationalistic commonplaces. In order to find alternatives to and transcend the
dried-out resources of contemporary Calvinist homiletics, Ravasz enthusiasti-
cally embraced a vitalist reassessment of the religious experience inspired by the
Dionysian cult of the instinct as put forward by the post-Nietzschean atmosphere
of his school years in the first decade of the 20th century:
It will be the business of future historians of the coming age to dis-
cover the ties between the assaulting anti-Christianism of Nietzsche
and the revolutionary transformation of modern theology, ties that
provide a bridge across the abyss now stretching between the theo-
logical and scientific worldviews, but as for me with thanksgiving I
bless the name of the Lord who even in the words of the fools bears
witness of Himself…Indeed all should agree that the concept of life
cannot be limited to vegetative existence (Ravasz, 1907, 20–1).
The young Ravasz reinterpreted Christianity as life, as more life, and as an im-
pulse and an instinct (“vallásösztön,” Ravasz, 1918, 7). In 1910, in the first collec-
tion of his sermons, a genre he cultivated from his time on with huge success, he
affirmed that,
the higher and purer the growing life is the nobler, more spiritual and
more valuable the joy is (Ravasz, 1910, 113).
These were not the conventional elements of Calvinist preaching, and Ravasz’s
fresh new discourse attracted a number of modernist scholars who were overtly
discontent with the predominantly historicist Hungarian intellectual tradition.
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The art theorist Lajos Fülep (1885–1970), member of the so-called Sunday Circle
[Vasárnapi Kör], an intellectual group including such personalities as Georg
Lukács, Karl Mannheim, and Karl Polányi, particularly welcomed Ravasz’s
growing influence and urged him to cooperate with left-wing-progressist periodi-
cals like the Twentieth Century [Huszadik Század] of the radical sociologist and
politician Oszkár Jászi (1875–1957) and World [Világ] of the Marxist theorist
Ervin Szabó (Fülep, 1918, 367).
The Trauma of Defeat: The Making of a Conservative Theology
In the crucial years of the First World War, however, Ravasz moved in the op-
posite direction, and from 1921 on he definitely made his name famous as one of
the most important spokespersons of the conservative turn of the interwar period.
This turn indeed was not without prior experiences in the earlier career of Ravasz.
His most important intellectual encounter was a Schopenhauerian reading of the
mal-de-siècle, which he thought to be a legitimate reaction to the advance of the
materialism of the industrial revolution and the coming of the age of class society
and its socialist challenge (Ravasz, 1907). This par excellence aesthetical ap-
proach and Ravasz’s appropriation of such prophets of the despair as
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche already pointed out the potentiality of an anti-liberal
theology. In a short essay written in 1914 he defined life as a “sublime and perma-
nent fight of self-defense” (Ravasz, 19142, 202). This essay was published in the
Protestant Review, the editorship of which Ravasz took over in January 1914,
quickly making it an important and much read forum of intellectual debate on reli-
gion and Protestantism (Szegedy-Maszák, 1995, 57–9). In his first editorial note
he characterized the contemporary situation of Hungarian Protestantism as “un-
aware of itself” (Ravasz, 1914, 1). He rejected the remaining illusion of the liberal
protestant alliance and also dismissed the inward looking pietism as escapism,
warning that
a new social order is under construction without Protestantism being
among the foremen, the modern man has arrived on his long journey
from the Renaissance but is not accompanied by Protestantism, so we
would be like the bark in the poem of Thomas Moore which moved
gloriously on when morning was shining, but the waters were gone
by night and the bark was still there, run aground (Ravasz, 19141, 3).
As previously mentioned, Ravasz’s transformation was accelerated during
World War I. He emphasized with increasing clarity that the objective of his much
appreciated sermons was, “to show how the old truth can be dressed in modern lit-
erary forms” (Ravasz, 1917, Foreword). This also drove him to prefer practice to
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theory. He finished his treatise on the axiology of Károly Böhm in 1913 and pub-
lished his voluminous Homiletics in 1916. These were his last scholarly syntheses
for decades. From 1914 he became more and more involved in the government of
the Church and he constantly preached. His lecture tours aimed to give a modern
meaning to missionary efforts, especially for the cultured middle classes, and to
reconcile institutional Christianity with the revival spiritual movements, domesti-
cating the non-conformist tendencies of the inner mission by integrating them into
a new offensive pastoral strategy of the official Church.
Recently, Dutch psychologist and historian Eelco Runia forcefully argued that,
“it is the degree of discontinuity rather than the amount of death and destruction
that makes an event traumatic” (Runia, 2010, 6). This makes intelligible the fact
that Hungary’s trauma of the Great War fed mainly from the humiliating defeat
and dismemberment of the country after the war and not from the troublesome
memory of the trench-fight and the colossal losses Hungary paid in human life
and blood. Like many of his contemporaries, Ravasz also wanted to sublimate the
historical experience of the national catastrophe that took place between 1918 and
1920, as well as the sense of threat felt in the shadow of the increasing influence of
totalitarian ideologies. According to his reminiscences,
The situation developed in such a way that it was necessary to choose
between two extreme either-or oppositions. In vain did someone ap-
prove of social reform, the inflexibility of ideological necessity
drove him into the opposite camp. Everything that attacked the old
was good, even if it upset the eternal laws of morality, and nothing
that sought to preserve the old was good, even if that old was called
the Ten Commandments or the Sermon on the Mount… In this fight
it was necessary to defend protective, inoculating factors such as reli-
gion, church, morals, nation, history and tradition. They had to be de-
fended in such a way that we preserved the reformist legacy and kept
the Roman leaven at bay, while feeling ourselves to be one with it in
Christ; to go as far as possible along the path of radical progress, but
without supporting the diabolical calamity of godlessness anywhere.
Looking back today [1960], when a great many things confront us in
a completely different light, it is clear to us that a radical social policy
should have been pursued based on a strong evangelical inspiration.
We who defended Hungary’s historical integrity, who proclaimed
the primacy of the spiritual, who espoused the truth of Revelation,
who raised our voices in favor of the absolute value of morality, in a
world that had slowly begun to unravel and crumble, could not have
done anything else than what we did: to try to preserve the good
(Ravasz, 1992, 122–3).
This text captures the sense of a combination of threats to religious, national and
historical existence. Despite the retrospective documentation (1960), the authen-
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ticity of the intensity of the experience is reinforced by the fact that the author of
these memoirs looks back at his years of change critically and acknowledges that
in more than one case the ideals under attack were “fetishes.” Back in the 1920s
the narcissistic frustration and the rhetoric of shame can be amply documented in
such declarations as his memorial speech on Count István Tisza, a Protestant mag-
nate and leading figure of the liberal-nationalist politics of the pre-1914 period:
We put down our arms and Rákóczi’s nation did not make a single
sword-cut to protect the Hungary that she at last proclaimed inde-
pendent. […] The nation lost everything like the donkey surprised to
be stripped off his stolen tiger fur (Ravasz, 1924, 15).
In the dreadful perspective of revolutionary totalitarianism offered by the
short-lived Hungarian Commune in the spring of 1919 many erstwhile liberals
sought refuge in the idea of a Christian Hungary with strong ethnic and many
times overtly expressed anti-Semitic overtones. Christian churches, both Catholic
and Protestant, experienced a renewal of their impact on society in the interwar
period. They were able to count on the continuous good will of the Horthy regime,
which shifted between liberal conservative and marked authoritarian tendencies
throughout the whole period. But the spectacular religious upheaval was seen by
quite a few observers with strong reservations. For the philosopher and essayist
Béla Hamvas (1897–1968) the “Heideggerian condition” of contemporary religi-
osity bode ill. As he wrote with prescience in the Catholic Review in 1937,
Some words need to be added about this modern religiosity. It has to
be admitted that part of the religiosity that has been spread after the
past war does not offer much for the man of the intellect. All signs
point to our being just after one worldwide man-slaughter and facing
a new one: an intermezzo between two mass massacres. We are fac-
ing hunger, epidemics, disability, ruined existence, privation and
poverty, and it may well be that some years later all repeats itself at
an even greater degree. People are threatened and the way they live
today – poor living conditions, social problems, economic and moral
depression – cannot dismiss this fear. All these circumstances made
man conscious of his being a creature, namely that he is living in the
state of throwness – Geworfenheit to use Heidegger’s word – : his
concerns about living, subsistence, the mother country and the family
are like thick, heavy, depressing clouds. And religiosity, which is the
reason for today’s overcrowded churches and the many prayers, of-
ten springs from these concerns. Certainly, the majority of the crowd
cannot see the divine reality. Which moment is the moment when
man can touch and recognize it? Which is the step that leads someone
beyond concerns, fear and intimidation into the real gate of religion?
This is the moment when one learns about eternity (Hamvas, 1937,
611–12).
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Little wonder that the “pagan temptation” to instrumentalize Christianity has in
numerous cases been explored by the prophets of violence. As in most parts of Eu-
rope, these voices echoing the experience of defeat and broken confidence were
amplified by the receptive mood of their many followers. In this respect the
widely shared self-perception of a nation defending itself against its internal and
external foes, the craving for continuous political preeminence, and first and fore-
most the underlying “great fear” of being out-distanced and relegated to the posi-
tion of an inferior sect were at least as prevalent as genuine religious factors in
shaping the confessional policy and behavior of the Christian Churches in inter-
war Hungary.
What distinguishes Ravasz from this pattern is that in his case an enthusiastic
embrace of new forms of propagating and reinforcing religious observance was
accompanied by a sincere return to the reformatory teachings of Predestination.
The anxious awareness of an all-encompassing menace pushed him to the refor-
mulation of the primordiality of the religious roots of Protestantism in the Calvin-
ist doctrine of election and predestination. The obligation to stand one’s ground
firmly in the face of the threat defines Ravasz’s preaching between the two world
wars. The sense of threat finds an active resolution in the belief in Predestination.
Ever since he read Calvin his exegesis focused on the idea of a sovereign God:
Calvin’s exclusive idea was the glory of God. All the other religious
ideologies revolved around one central problem: the happiness of
man, that is why all the other religions are fundamentally
eudaemonistic.[…] Calvin cut the artery of this way of thinking by
his axiom not that God is for us, but we are for Him (Ravasz, 1909,
36).
This standpoint is reminiscent of the functional explanation of the doctrine of pre-
destination by Heiko A. Oberman (Oberman, 2003, 148–9). Oberman recognizes
the attractiveness of this grim vision of the world in the existential situation of the
defeated. Predestination is the core teaching of the Reformation of the Refugees.
The dynamics of an imminent destruction found a tremendous assurance in the ab-
soluteness of divine sovereignty:
God has redeemed us in a way similar to how the grains are included
in a granite block, we cannot be separated from Him as you cannot
remove the grains even after smashing the granite block (Ravasz,
1922, 101).
As might be expected, this doctrine concedes almost nothing to human endeavors
and consequently deprives the concept of progress of whatever positive value it
might hold: “in God there is no temporal difference or difference whatsoever be-
tween intention and result.” On the other hand, he fosters a highly dichotomic an-
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thropology of history and social interactions: “God has created our world so that
the small number of the chosen few necessarily points to the great number of the
rejected” (Ravasz, 1922, 100). One of the main characteristics of this existen-
tial-predestinatory attitude is the marked relativization of man’s freedom of ac-
tion, as a result of which the thought-pattern of progress necessarily becomes de-
valued.
Towards a New Appraisal of Catholicism
The existential situation that affected the theological stance of Ravasz was also
reflected in a new kind of appraisal of contemporary Catholicism. Ravasz’s inter-
war image of the Reformation anticipates the conclusion reached by most of the
mid-century church historiography that the centuries-long preparation for reli-
gious renewal led not only to the birth of Protestantism but to the “Tridentine re-
newal” of Catholicism as well:
The Cluniac reform of the medieval church should be called a refor-
mation, just like the Council of Trent, which carried out the greatest
and most characteristic reformation from a Catholic viewpoint
(Ravasz, 1935, 503).
The significance of the Reformation thus becomes integrated into an approach
justifying the historical pluralism of the modern era on religious grounds:
Here two historical forces, two types of Christian world view and life practice
confront each other. This is not just a theoretical or theological difference, but a
development of cultural history as well, and as such, it is a basic factor of the hu-
man spirit itself (Ravasz, 1934, 497).
In another lecture Ravasz evaluates the significance of the Protestant-Catholic di-
vide in contrast to the tradition of the Enlightenment:
Since the creation of the world every spiritual question has been
transformed into a political and economic question… we cannot
imagine a greater betrayal, a graver sin against the Holy Spirit than if
someone were to keep silent about a spiritual truth which he feels to
be God’s holiest cause simply because espousing and proclaiming it
would have unpleasant consequences on account of rotten human na-
ture. This would excise the history-shaping power of the prophetical
from the living organism of humanity (Ravasz, 1936, 511).
The highlighting of the prophetical and the acceptance of religious pluralism ex-
presses not merely the experience of crisis but also “today’s apocalyptic times,”
when Christianity “is threatened in its entirety” by Communism and Nazism:
234 PÁL HATOS
Christianity has hidden common bases which are greater, more es-
sential and more important than the torn or divided superstructure
(Ravasz, 1937, 161–5).
It is of no small importance that, through the interpretation of predestination, the
most particularly Calvinist idea of reformatory identity, Ravasz found the current
duties of Protestant conduct in an image of society and a strategy of action kindred
to those of contemporary Catholicism. This may appear paradoxical at first
glance, because the rapprochement represented a problem even more difficult for
its Catholic proponents than for the Protestant side. The Catholic–Protestant rela-
tion was far from being an unambiguous issue. But behind the spectacular in-
stances of conflicts and the sometimes comical rivalry over preeminence a new
commencement was at work.
“And after all, What Do Our Faiths Have in Common?”
The Catholic Motivations of the Rapprochement
The trauma experienced by the Roman Catholic Church in 19th century Europe
was first and foremost the seemingly triumphant march of the triangular synthesis
of liberalism, nationalism and progress. This story is known from various angles,
and narratives of decadence and reactionary opposition prevail in most of the
scholarly literature. Much less has been written about how Catholicism overcame
the modernist crisis with a successful adaptation of the very same semantic instru-
ments that liberalism and nationalism established in the political language. By set-
ting up frontiers and crystallizing distinctively modern confessional attitudes (a
Catholic mentalité) in the wake of the 19th century Kulturkampfs, the Roman
Catholic Church found ways to take possession of some of the very inventions of
modern times, such as the concept of the nation and the democratic politics of
emancipation (Blaschke, 2000, 35–75). The lasting impact of the Hungarian
“Catholic Renaissance” (1894–1948) also comes from the reappraisal of “univer-
sal brotherhood” (Benedict Anderson) implicit in all nationalism and the appro-
priation of such fundamentally modern ideas as universal suffrage and the defense
of religious liberty, both in the name of the democratic majority (i.e. the Catholics
who made up statistically more than two-thirds of Hungary’s population after
1920). From the Christian-socialism of the charismatic bishop and controversial
theologian Ottokár Prohászka (1858–1927), initiator of the “Catholic Renais-
sance,” to the popular Marian nationalism of Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty
(1892–1975), many inspired leading Catholic churchmen appealed successfully
to the synthesis of Catholicism and Hungarian national identity by exploiting the
various instruments and media of modern mass democracy and the politics of the
ALEAS OF HISTORY AND FRONTIERS OF MODERNITY 235
“majority.” And in the case of Cardinal Mindszenty, in the dichotomy of the Cold
War his unswerving anticommunism was seen through his trials by many, espe-
cially in the United States, as the authentic testimony of the idea of religious lib-
erty (Mojzes, 1992, 241; O’Connor, 37–66).
This historical metamorphosis can also be tracked by exploring the sinuous in-
tellectual paths of some of the most significant protagonists of the “Catholic Re-
naissance.” The difficulty of the matter is well characterized by the attitude of
Ottokár Prohászka (1858–1927), Bishop of Székesfehérvár, towards the
Protestant churches. By dint of his intellectual abilities and influence, Prohászka
was by far the preeminent theologian among Catholic clerical leaders and initia-
tors of the “Catholic Renaissance.” In contrast to the denominational conflicts of
the first decades of the twentieth century and the interwar period, Prohászka’s bi-
ographers refer to the universality of the bishop’s thinking, which shielded him
from denominational bias. In connection with this, they often cite Prohászka’s
metaphor of a “rainbow-bridge” as well: “I would like a rainbow-bridge of love to
stretch between [Catholic] Pannonhalma and [Calvinist] Debrecen, on which the
angels of understanding would tread, and this bridge would be a new Hungarian
meridian” (Gergely, 1994, 126). However, Prohászka, who died in 1927, made
statements of another character as well. In one of his diary entries for 1922 he
writes as follows:
It is completely clear to me that in our country one should not think of
the struggling sides in terms of Catholic or Protestant, but rather as
world historical, and from a theoretical standpoint only thusly: Ca-
tholicism or socialism, because revolution, the ancient schism, was
in fact an attack against Catholicism, against Christianity. One must
not lose sight of this; this does not mean that Protestants are not
Christians individually, but the Christian principle is not Protestant-
ism, and indeed, Protestantism denies that. The contrast between
Catholic and Protestant is practically anachronistic, a somewhat de-
layed and artificial and insincere distinction. He who makes it hon-
estly, I mean in good faith, has not reached back to the actual princi-
ple: the nature of revolution. I, too, usually proclaim the cooperation
between Catholic and Protestant, in as much as … by this I consider
one or two positions as defensible. But not for one moment do I rely
on this cooperation. And after all, what do our faiths have in com-
mon? [emphasis in the original] (Prohászka, 1997, 185).
What is important in the citation is not primarily the statement relativizing his
calls for denominational reconciliation, but rather that the mistrust of Protestant-
ism expressed in raw form in his diary stems from the historicization that com-
pares Protestantism’s founding event, the Reformation, to the revolutionary prin-
ciple, socialism. According to the modern history of the concept of revolution,
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revolution is a political slogan that recreates itself incessantly in various positive
and negative definitions, but one that also carries within itself the original mean-
ing of the word, the concept of “eternal return,” taken from nature (Koselleck,
1985). In this semantic framework Prohászka’s historicization links Protestantism
and socialism with the “ancient schism,” the origin myth, because in this way he
can interpret both as a revolt against the divine order, according to the dialectic of
the struggle between the true and the false, between good and evil. This exposition
reveals the homogenous time of waiting for salvation and the end of days. Like
any apocalyptic reading, it does not establish a developmental or qualitative rank-
ing among historical movements, but only their chronological sequence, and it
classifies events and processes simply according to whether they build the “city of
God” or attack it.
However, the citation also reveals that the above explanatory principle could
not have completely satisfied Prohászka, who dealt with the problem of temporal-
ity in depth throughout his career and was also familiar with the Bergsonian phi-
losophy of “creative evolution.” Behind the statement may lurk the worrisome re-
alization that the dialectic of history is increasingly pushing the theological debate
between Catholicism and Protestantism into the background, because the asym-
metrical relationship between the revolutionary and utopian mode of thought
emerging time and again from the traditions of the Enlightenment and the reli-
gions forced onto the defensive questions the very right of religion itself to exist.
In another diary entry, he reveals his doubts about whether the professed and rep-
resented redemptive truth can be carried to victory in the pluralist maelstrom of
truth-demands:
It is extraordinarily difficult for the church to find its place and its
way, and namely to reform – as they say – its position vis-à-vis hu-
man freedoms in a timely and correct manner. Even now the church
holds the view that it should restrict the freedom of evil by force as
well, or to break it if this is possible. This is proper if we believe that
truth is the exclusive domain of the church; but today’s era does not
accept this, and thus it arrives at a disadvantaged position vis-à-vis
modern culture. But in any case the spirit of the times has changed, in
as much as it is considered impermissible to interfere in the moral
world by force. And somehow this is true. But this feeling once again
may have become general when it became clear with the passage of
time that one cannot cope with violence. Now Constantines the Great
are of no use to the church, nor are Charlemagnes; and Saint Stephens
[here the author is referring to the Hungarian king Stephen I
(972–1038), founder of the medieval Hungarian state] only to the ex-
tent that they promote morality, and not with the bluster of legalities.
I know that in this way, too, we reach a dead-end, but this is perhaps
the lesser evil. I am dumbfounded (Prohászka, 1997, 87–8).
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The difficulty of accepting religious freedom as the “lesser of two evils” emerges
unmistakably from the lines penned by Prohászka immediately following the col-
lapse of the communist dictatorship of 1919. It is common knowledge that the
Catholic Church accepted the principle of religious freedom only with great diffi-
culty, in the wake of the Second Vatican Council. This difficulty arises from the
understandable fear that the consistent representation of genuine tolerance may
not only relativize our own most sacred convictions, but in the end may even elim-
inate the objective existence of truth from thought. The price that had to be paid
for religious neutrality and for tolerance, as well as for the emancipatory hopes
born of the Enlightenment and spilling into revolutionary violence, established
the permanent crisis of the European intellect and the culture of crisis in the West-
ern history of ideas of the past two hundred years. At the same time Prohászka was
also forced to recognize – and the disparaging reference to the founding father
King Stephen, the “Hungarian Catholic” saint par excellence, also expresses
this – that religious hopes were suited only to a limited extent to function as the di-
rect source for the formation of political or national will, because their past valid-
ity in this regard represented a dubious and always ephemeral solution. In that re-
spect another leading conservative thinker of the period, the historian and de-
voutly Catholic Gyula Szekfû (1883–1955) found the roots of the aggressive and
omnipresent modern-day nationalisms in the chaotic conflicts of the primitive
tribal societies. He could not assign the national idea anything more than a mi-
metic calling: “to try to invoke the unequalled classical ideal of the Greco-roman
civilization in the heart of all nations” (Szekfû, 1934, 441; Szekfû, 1936, 149).
“Christians of the World, Unite!”
An article about the possibilities of a Christian union written by the famous
(and infamous) standard-bearer of political Catholicism, the Jesuit Béla Bangha
(1880–1940), and appearing in 1937 with the astonishing paraphrase of the slogan
of the Communist Manifesto, “Christians of the World, Unite!” was influenced to
a great degree by these realizations. The study, which in any case surprised his
contemporaries as well, was a radical departure from his earlier polemical and
militant stance. This was first of all because of the fact that it expressed the un-
comfortable realization of the discontinuity of history, as well as acknowledge-
ment that the desire for the unification of Christians and the possible realization of
Christian unity must come about not simply as the restoration of some natural or-
der of things, but as a response to a new historical situation undeniably bearing its
own uniqueness:
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The age of denominational wars and polemics has long passed; in
their place, however, the far-reaching secularization of life and cul-
ture is striking, the cause of which is partially the divide among
Christians. In families, companies, associations or community
houses of mixed faith, out of sheer tact alone no one really raises
questions of religion anymore; the result of which later is that the
most beautiful, noblest ideals, those that most profoundly interest hu-
man life and are called upon to elevate it, are increasingly excluded
from public thought and public attention (Bangha, 1937, 15).
This statement does not dispense with a profound sense of nostalgia either, which
is fueled by melancholy stemming from the radical change in the historical situa-
tion:
Only by rising not to historic but almost metaphysical heights can we
truly comprehend the great need for a revision of the denominational
situation. What a blissful and, we might even say, blissfully simple
age it was when everyone still stood on the basis of Christian ideol-
ogy, so much so that the debate was about whether Christ had de-
creed seven sacraments, or only two, or three! So much has today’s
skepticism chewed away and undermined the flooring and soil of our
life of faith that today we must now ponder whether we can save for
the masses of the coming centuries faith in the personal God himself
and the basic tenets of Christianity (Bangha, 1942, 494).
The final phrase in the above passage is in no way a sociological diagnosis, since
like Protestant observers, Bangha himself noted the postwar religious upswing,
which was not limited to Catholicism. This religious dynamism uniting denomi-
nations did not invalidate, but rather confirmed the bitter prognosis, which
Bangha applied primarily to religious communities, and which takes as its point of
departure the determination that, parallel to the inevitable weakening of the bind-
ing force of traditions and customs, religious communities in the future
will undergo enormous crises. Anti-church agitation, anti-religious
movements, doubt and indifference, the materialization and
sensualization of life, the advancing self-consciousness and individ-
ualization of the masses will likely lead to the practical
de-Christianization of broad strata, eventually leading to the loss
among religious communities of a great share of their members
(Bangha, 1942, 411–12).
As can be seen, at the end of the 1930s and start of the 1940s the chief motivat-
ing force of Catholic–Protestant rapprochement, emerging on the initiative of
Bangha, was precisely Christianity’s sense of being “threatened in its entirety,” as
another Catholic participant in the debate, the Benedictine monk and abbot of
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Pannonhalma Krizosztom Kelemen, put it a few years later. Kelemen, who nur-
tured warm relations with Protestant leaders like László Ravasz, articulated this
idea in apocalyptic images in 1942, in the very middle of the war:
This meeting will have practical significance only if it is able to pre-
vent mutual collapse… Today the Lord once again speaks to us
amidst thunder and lightning. This raises the question: shall we con-
tinue to wait for more dangerous earthquakes and more terrible
storms to destroy our planet, like those which have attacked our
blood-soaked land, afflicted by discord, pettiness, selfishness, envy
and hatred, and for frighteningly organized forces to be raised to de-
stroy the country of God, to exterminate his followers, so that they
might chase God himself from his throne and permanently expunge
once and for all the notion of God from the consciousness of the peo-
ple? (Kelemen, 1942, 116)
In the end, the troubling international situation, the pressure of the National So-
cialist and Bolshevik menace, and progressing secularization tore asunder the har-
monious relationship between religion and culture as contained in the rational
conceptual systems of thought, neo-Thomism on the Catholic side and neo-Kant-
ianism on the Protestant side. Imre Révész (1889–1967), the leading Protestant
historian of the period and an erstwhile disciple and close ally of László Ravasz,
arrived at the conclusion that religious pluralism is only vital if it does not come
into contradiction with the calling of the prophets of Christianity. At the same
time, this prophetic calling again and again caused the tension between culture
and history, as well as eschatological message of Christianity, to appear:
The Scriptures teach us that human history has no imminent final
goal at all, and that the ideals of culture are not absolute values
(Révész, 1941, 199).
The Catholic Bangha likewise could only maintain his earlier conviction con-
cerning the stubborn presence of religious concerns if he placed them in an escha-
tological interpretation of the theology of history that superseded the old dichot-
omy of the Kulturkampf. By doing so Bangha, under the influence of Gyula
Szekfû and incidentally representing views similar to those of his Protestant coun-
terparts László Ravasz and Imre Révész, rejected critically the view that
instrumentalized Christianity in the service of the national idea:
The Lord God as a national staffage, religious truths as separate Ro-
manian, Turkish or Russian revelations, the gospel as a Hungarian or
Armenian or Bulgarian national specialty – these are bizarre concep-
tual formations (Bangha, 1942, 235).
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In his search for the meaning of centuries-long religious wars in his later writings,
Bangha no longer saw in the Reformation the illegal methods of the revolutionary
path (which he, too, had condemned previously) and the historical catastrophe of
Christianity, but rather the promotion of a Christian existence and mode of action
of a new quality:
Cruelty, faithfulness and impatience melted together here to form a
peculiar concoction, and perhaps the Lord God permitted this horri-
ble fraternal extermination in the name of faith so that through it the
Church might be cleansed and educated, and learn that there is no
room for hatred in the defense of a religious ideal (Bangha, 1942,
497).
His predecessor and in part inspiration, Prohászka, when he came to this realiza-
tion, had written, “I am dumbfounded!” However, in his final studies, Bangha,
who on his deathbed in 1940 treaded the interpretational borderline of dogma and
also espoused a cautious revision of the image of the church articulated by the
Council of Trent, examined the Catholic possibilities for distinguishing between
the notions of the visible and invisible church:
But however much we Catholics recognize the correctness and ne-
cessity of the position of the Council of Trent, that is, however much
we affirm that Christ our Lord founded not only an invisible but a vis-
ible church as well, and wanted not only an abstract unity among his
followers but an organizational unity as well, nevertheless we still
cannot deny, and the Council of Trent did not wish to deny either,
that outside of the community of the church organization we should
recognize the community of faith as well (Bangha, 1942, 465).
In fact, in his late, posthumously published writings Bangha, quoting the writings
of the French Dominican monk Yves Congar, the spiritual progenitor of the Sec-
ond Vatican Council, wrote of the partial fulfillment of the universality of
Catholicization taking place within the Catholic Church, and in doing so even ar-
rived at the concept of a votum baptismi implicitum, which later served as the basis
for Karl Rahner’s all-inclusive conception of Christianity:
We can comprehend the ecumenical idea in another way too: based
on the complete, even if only desired, unity and life of faith that can
be found in every kind of Christian denomination, we can regard as
one all those who until now failed to carry out their solidification into
the complete and organic unity only because they had not yet recog-
nized the proper way to do so and God’s will regarding this. They
may rightly be regarded, to a certain degree unconsciously, as chil-
dren of the Catholic Church, mainly if, by virtue of a life of faith, they
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too are undoubtedly living members of that mysterious body that is
the Church (Bangha, 1942, 460).
Outside of their specific content, all of these statements have significance from a
historical perspective, primarily on account of their chronology, because the tem-
poral dimension of the statements quoted testifies to the profundity of existential
involvement, especially considering that while a large part of their authors’
lifework, when viewed from the present day, can be classified as an extremely
problematic, and in many respects irrelevant, mode of thought, in one of their con-
clusions the writings quoted above anticipate the attitude and image of the church
held by a theological-intellectual movement still emergent in many respects to-
day, the Second Vatican Council. The late and radical turnabout in the career of
the Jesuit Bangha – from the exclusivity of the political Catholicism he himself
militantly represented to the existential experience of an ecumenicalism that
moved beyond denominational and national conflicts – is also interesting with re-
gard to the connections between the history of ideas and biography. As in the case
of Ravasz, his turnabout was undoubtedly a conservative one, attempting to rec-
oncile conflicting identities defined on a dogmatic basis rather than – in contrast
to the intellectual traditions of the Enlightenment – relativize them. By redefining
what is religious, and thus partially re-articulating the religious attitude, the cur-
rents of Protestant and Catholic thought in interwar Hungary presented above es-
tablished on both the Protestant and Catholic sides intellectual contexts which
make not only the historical description of Christian identity but also the very no-
tion of modernity a function of multi-layered readings that are dynamic and plu-
ralistic on the individual level as well.
But at the same time the rapprochement of Catholic and Protestant interpreta-
tions of history may be interpreted as a symptom of the decline of religious expla-
nations of the world and history. They testify to the fact that the dialectics of his-
torical interpretation are no longer defined by the particular approaches of Catho-
lic or Protestant theology or the differences between them, but rather by the state
of competition between universalist utopias and religious world explanations
forced into the conservative camp, which necessarily bleaches the emphatic ele-
ments of Christian teachings as well.
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